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‘Ideas... ideas, I must confess, interest me more than men - interest me more than 
anything. They live; they fight; they perish like men. Of course it may be said 
that our only knowledge of them is through men, just as our only knowledge of 
the wind is through the reeds that it bends; but all the same the wind is of more 
importance than the reeds.’
 
‘The wind exists independently of the reed,’ ventured Bernard.
His intervention made Edouard, who had long been waiting for it, start afresh 
with renewed spirit:  ‘Yes, I know; ideas exist only because of men; but that’s 
what’s so pathetic; they live at their expense.’ 
 
— André Gide, The Counterfeiters
Our wager can be formulated as follows: there are ideas which can only be 
consistently thought of within certain forms of collective organization. That 
is, there are ideas which can only be properly developed if their conceptual 
construction is tied together with the practical construction of a given 
institutional space. 
	 This	hypothesis	does	not	seem	so	perplexing	at	first	-	after	all,	is	this	
not exactly what is at stake in the so called “group mind”, when we witness 
the production of shared sense between people within a given group? In this 
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case, we also encounter ideas which, for anyone outside of that particular 
organization, appear as outright inconsistent or irrelevant, but which, within 
the collective, play a fundamental role: even if their irrational character might 
make them conceptually inadequate, these ideas nevertheless function as crucial 
identificatory	traits.	The	study	of	these	effects	of	sense	produced	within	groups	
have further reinforced the commonsensical notion that serious study should 
avoid such collective structures - clear and distinct ideas are supposed to have 
an	affinity	with	solitude.	This,	however,	is	not	what	the	present	text	is	concerned	
with. Even though the role of sense in the formation of groups is undeniable, 
and	can	have	both	useful	and	terrifying	effects,	we	must	first	of	all	shed	away	
our fascination with this well-documented phenomena in order to face another 
- more fragile - site for investigation: the hypothesis that certain true ideas are 
only thinkable through a collective engagement. In short, this is not a thesis 
about ideals	-	that	is,	common	traits	which	organize	the	identifications	within	
a group - but rather about ideas - rational concepts which, as thoughts, can 
produce consequences in the world. 
 But why would ideas, if true, be tied together with such a seemingly 
accidental condition, how could a group, which is nonetheless composed of 
separate and distinguishable thinking individuals, be a necessary condition for 
certain forms of thinking? Furthermore - and perhaps more importantly - even 
if we accept such a hypothesis, how could we distinguish it from yet another 
localized	identificatory	mark?	That	is,	if	this	idea	itself	has	emerged	within	a	
collective	project	and	remains	at	first	unfounded	and	inconsistent,	what	sets	it	
apart from being mere a group ideal? 
 In this contribution we seek to develop the basic conceptual framework to 
make our hypothesis consistent and intelligible, and then to present a concrete 
case study of what it might mean to consolidate an institution that seeks to live 
up	to	this	affirmation.	Thus,	after	proposing	our	theory	of	ideas,	we	will	turn	
to the case of the Circle of Studies of Idea and Ideology, the collective project 
whose ongoing experimentation for the last 5 years in fact conditions the ideas 
developed in this text. In a sense, then, if the present work is able to attest to the 
consistency of its hypothesis, given that this hypothesis itself is the irreducible 
product of a collective effort at constructing an institution, we should have, by 
extension,	provided	the	first	proof	of	its	validity.	
§ 1
In	the	first	chapter	of	Capital, Marx makes the following comparison between 
measuring the weight and the value of two things:
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A sugar-loaf being a body, is heavy, and therefore has weight: but we 
can neither see nor touch this weight. We then take various pieces of 
iron, whose weight has been determined beforehand. The iron, as iron, 
is no more the form of manifestation of weight, than is the sugar-loaf. 
Nevertheless, in order to express the sugar-loaf as so much weight, 
we put it into a weight-relation with the iron. In this relation, the 
iron	officiates	as	a	body	representing	nothing	but	weight.	A	certain	
quantity of iron therefore serves as the measure of the weight of the 
sugar, and represents, in relation to the sugar-loaf, weight embodied, 
the form of manifestation of weight. This part is played by the iron 
only within this relation, into which the sugar or any other body, whose 
weight has to be determined, enters with the iron. Were they not 
both heavy, they could not enter into this relation, and the one could 
therefore not serve as the expression of the weight of the other. When 
we throw both into the scales, we see in reality, that as weight they are 
both the same, and that, therefore, when taken in proper proportions, 
they have the same weight. Just as the substance iron, as a measure of 
weight, represents in relation to the sugar-loaf weight alone, so, in our 
expression of value, the material object, coat, in relation to the linen, 
represents value alone.
 Here, however, the analogy ceases. The iron, in the expression of 
the weight of the sugar-loaf, represents a natural property common 
to both bodies, namely their weight; but the coat, in the expression 
of value of the linen, represents a non-natural property of both, 
something purely social, namely, their value. (Marx, 1976: 148)
 
First, the weight-relation: in order to express the physical property of weight 
of a given body, one must place it in relation to another body, in a scale, so 
that	this	invisible	and	immediately	impalpable	property	of	the	first	body	might	
appear embodied as the second one. Marx makes two essential remarks about 
this process: (a) this scalar relation of proportion can only take place if the two 
bodies have the same consistency, i.e. both are physical bodies and therefore 
share the property of being heavy; (b) while the two bodies must be physically 
homogeneous, in the weight-relation they take up different functions: the weight 
of	the	first	body,	which	cannot	be	directly	apprehended,	appears	as	the	material	
body of the second element in the relation - the sugar-loaf weighs so much 
iron. This comparison allows Marx to exemplify what he had previously called 
the “simple or accidental value-form” (ibid: 139), which puts into relation the 
immaterial	value	of	a	first	commodity	with	the	materially	determined	use-value	
of another. Marx terms the position of this second body - which, in the example, 
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is responsible for incarnating in its immediate heaviness the “essential” property 
of	the	first	body	-	the	equivalent	form	in	the	relation,	while	the	first	term	-	here	
the sugar-loaf - is called the relative form, since it is the body whose essential 
property,	at	first	invisible,	becomes	expressed	in	the	relation	with	the	physicality	
of the second body. 
 This analogy, however, has a limit, which marks the distinction between 
natural and non-natural, or social, forms. When we place two physical bodies in 
a weight-relation, the measure expressed in their relation, as a certain quantity 
of the second body, exists in each body independently of us putting them in 
relation in a scale. Physical bodies are naturally heavy, not only “comparatively” 
so - the comparison of two bodies only allows us to express their weight, it only 
makes weight legible as such. The value of commodities, on the other hand, is 
inherently social - that is, it is itself relational. Commodities, when removed from 
the	field	of	exchange-relations,	maintain	only	their	natural	and	heterogeneous	
determinations,	those	responsible	for	each	of	their	use-values,	but	we	find	there	
nothing to be expressed regarding value as such. 
 This leads us to add a third remark to the previous ones, namely, the 
fact that the homogeneity between the bodies in a given relation must be 
extended to the “scale”, the measurement, itself: physical forms are made 
legible by physical scales while social forms are made legible by social scales. 
This thesis, which vacillates between the self-evident and the obscure, allows 
us to determine a fundamental distinction between the natural and the social 
relations, for in the latter case the being that is comparatively “measured” 
and the comparison itself are not only of the same consistency, but are rather 
indiscernible - nothing distinguishes what it means to express the value of a 
commodity and what it means for commodities to constitute their value to 
begin with.
 This is, thus, the limit of Marx’s analogy, and the starting point of our 
investigation: social forms, such as the value-form, become rational - that is, 
enter into relations of proportion which make certain of its properties legible 
- through the very same process that renders them actual. The very being of 
the social relation under investigation is homogeneous and indistinguishable 
from the process through which its properties become legible for us. In a 
certain sense, the “social scale” which we need in order to express the value-
form is part of the value-form: it is not the actor in the exchange process which 
abstracts and renders commensurate the different commodities put there in 
relation - were this the case, at the moment of exchange of two commodities 
we	could	not	be	concerned,	as	we	most	definitely	are,	with	their	use-values	-	
rather, it is the form of value itself, an enigmatic dimension of the form of the 
commodities at stake in the exchange, which is responsible for producing their 
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commensurability. It is this insight which leads Alfred Sohn-Rethel to conclude 
that
[a] closer analysis would reveal that the ‘transcendental unity of the 
self-consciousness’, to use the Kantian expression for the phenomenon 
here	involved,	is	itself	an	intellectual	reflection	of	one	of	the	elements	
of the exchange abstraction, the most fundamental one of all, the 
form of exchangeability of the commodities underlying the unity of 
money	and	of	the	social	synthesis.	I	define	the	Kantian	‘transcendental	
subject’ as a fetish concept of the capital function of money. (Sohn-
Rethel, 1971: 76-77)
In	an	uncanny	way,	we	find	that	the	true	“social	scientist”,	the	empty	instance	
capable of neutrally placing social beings in a social scale, measuring and 
comparing value, is none other than the commodity itself, which “evolves out 
of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin 
dancing of its own free will” (ibid: 163).
 We have just examined the “meta-economical” hypothesis that the subject 
of science in political economy is not the actor of exchange, but something that 
is implicated and determined by the commodity-form itself. Irreducibly social 
forms are in fact constituted by the indistinguishable point where their being 
and their thought mutually support each other, but such a point paradoxically 
does not coincide with ourselves as thinking beings: the starting point of Capital 
is rather that there is such a thing as a social form which thinks - “a form of 
thought that is distinct from thought” (Zizek, 1989: 19). 
 However, while this thesis has become the cornerstone for a sophisticated 
theory of fetishism, our wager is that such a social dimension of thought, albeit 
inherently dislodged from us, does not necessarily coincide with ideology as 
such. In short: we maintain that the thought produced by social forms must be 
grasped not only as ideology but also as an idea.
§ 2
Our departing point thus renders meaningful the following question: if there 
are rational ideas which do not precede the collective, providing a rule for its 
organization, but are rather produced by the grouping itself, how are we to 
discern them? That is, what is the local trait - if any - which sets these social 
ideas apart from group ideals as well as from ideas which could have been 
thought independently from the institution of a collective project? 
	 This	problem	leads	us	to	a	seemingly	distinct	field	of	enquiry,	most	clearly	
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM
Volume 1, Issue 1: What Does Intellectual Freedom Mean Today? A Provocation
161
approached by Giorgio Agamben in his study of St. Francis in The Highest 
Poverty, where he investigates the relation between rules and life: 
[It] could thus be said that the regula vitae is that by means of which 
one lives, which corresponds perfectly to the expression regula 
vivificans	that	will	define	the	Franciscan	rule	in	Angelo	Clareno.	The	
rule is not applied to life, but produces it and at the same time is 
produced in it. What type of texts are the rules, then, if they seem to 
performatively realize the life that they must regulate? And what is a 
life that can no longer be distinguished from the rule? (Agamben, 2013: 
69)
A life that cannot be distinguished from the rule - this is what Agamben calls 
a form-of-life: a life that cannot be separated from its form without ceasing to 
be life (Agamben, 2000: 3). At stake in the investigation of the form-of-life is, 
therefore, a very similar problem to the one we have previously formulated. 
Marx has shown us that social practices can produce real abstractions, 
abstractions which are disjunct from any particular thinker of that practice - 
for example, the fundamental abstraction which produces the homogeneous 
social being of commodities. Such an abstraction will therefore present two 
properties: (a) it does not pre-exist the social practice, but is produced by it; 
(b) it provides the conditions for such practice, but not as a regulative principle 
to	which	participants	willingly	adequate	themselves.	To	affirm	that	such	
disjunction between individual thinkers and social thought might in fact produce 
emancipatory effects means that we must be able to conceive a practice which, 
not disavowing the existence of this “thought without a thinker”, nevertheless 
establishes a different relation to it than the one encountered in commodity 
exchange. It is precisely such a novel relation between (abstract) rule and (real) 
life that Agamben recognizes as a Franciscan invention:
Paraphrasing the scholastic saying forma dat esse rei (“form gives 
being to the thing”), one could state here that norma dat esse rei 
(“norm gives being to the thing”, Conte, p.526). A form of life would 
thus	be	the	collection	of	constitutive	rules	that	define	it.	But	can	one	
say	in	this	sense	that	the	monk,	like	the	pawn	in	chess,	is	defined	by	
the sum of the prescriptions according to which he lives? Could one 
not rather say with greater truth exactly the opposite, that it is the 
monk’s form of life that creates his rules? Perhaps both theses are 
true, on the condition that we specify that rules and life enter here 
into a zone of indifference, in which  - as there is no longer the very 
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possibility of distinguishing them - they allow a third thing to appear, 
which	the	Franciscans,	albeit	without	succeeding	in	defining	it	with	
precision, will call “use”. (Agamben, 2013: 71)
In order to unearth the deep resonance between Agamben’s study and our own 
hypothesis,	we	must	first	examine	the	re-doubling	of	the	rule	proposed	by	his	
reading of the Franciscan form of life. The social form appears here both as the 
“collection	of	constitutive	rules”	which	define	the	practice	of	a	given	collectivity	
and as a strange “formal surplus” of life itself, the collateral consolidation of a 
certain way of living (ibid: 92), which does not coincide with the written rules to 
which one’s conduct should measure up. 
 Let us give two complementary examples of this division of the rule 
into a rule that constrains individual lives and a rule that produces a way of 
living.	The	first	demonstrates	how	this	redoubling	in	fact	inverts	the	relation	
between adequacy and exception to the law in the Franciscan orientation. In 
one	of	the	oldest	commentaries	on	the	monastic	rule	we	find	the	following	
statement: “Wearing shoes depends on a dispensation from the rule in the case 
of necessity; not wearing shoes is the form of life” (Agamben, 2013: 108). That is: 
the cases which, by some necessity or another, allow the monk to be exempted 
from following the rule of walking barefoot are all listed and methodically 
written down, while following the monastic precept, being barefoot, is not 
written anywhere as a rule. According to this logic, the book of monastic rules 
would only rule over exceptions to the rule, while following the rule would itself 
take the form of an absolute exception. Walking barefoot is not “accidentally” 
left out of the book: were it to be written as a commandment, it would cease 
to be what it is - for such exceptional habit, when performed, allows us to say 
of one’s life not that it is adequate, but rather that it is exemplary (ibid: 14). To 
maintain the habit of walking barefoot beyond both duty (to submit life to the 
rule) and the right (to exempt life from certain restrictions) is a condition for it 
to found a more profound relation with the rule it incarnates: walking barefoot 
becomes not the case of a rule that preceded the walking, but rather, in walking, 
the rule itself is being made actual.
 However, there is another effect of such a division of the rule: at the point 
where rule and life become indistinct, we encounter not only the rule which 
exists only as life, but also the life that exists only as the rule - which Agamben 
exemplifies	with	the	case	of	the	habitual	study	of	monastic	rules	by	the	monks	
themselves	(ibid:	78).	As	the	philosopher	notes,	within	the	book	of	rules	we	find	
a chapter on the task of reading out loud from the book of rules once a day, in 
a continuous fashion, during certain meals. This means that the monks must, at 
some point, by following this rule, read the text of the chapter which prescribes 
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this rule itself, a rule whose enactment is to read it. Therefore, at the moment of 
reading	the	prescription,	which	in	fact	specifies	the	exact	words	with	which	the	
monk should begin every this reading, “his lectio realizes the exemplary instance 
of an enunciation of the rule that coincides with its execution, of an observance 
that is rendered indiscernible from the command that it obeys” (ibid: 77)
 The re-doubling or division of the law therefore creates a “zone of 
indifference” between rule and life, where it becomes impossible to tell what 
is the norm and what is that which follows the norm, for the life which is being 
ruled is in fact created by the norm itself - that is, “the norm gives being to the 
thing”. 
 We can recognize here a very similar structure to that of the real 
abstraction implied in the social form of commodity exchange: the process 
of thinking the value of commodities is indistinguishable from the process of 
constitution of the commodities themselves because the comparison which 
expresses their value is the same operation which consolidates their social 
being. In this sense, the norm which regulates the social practice does give 
being to the social thing - this is what is at stake in Slavoj Zizek’s logion: “in 
the	social	field,	the	‘as	if’	is	the	thing	itself”	(Zizek,	2010:	285):	the	postulate	of	
acting “as if” commodities are homogeneous is precisely what constitutes their 
social being. And it is precisely in such an operation, through which a given 
practice not only conforms itself to a set of precepts, but produces a formal, 
abstract dimension that is irreducibly linked to the practical dimension of rule-
following, which Agamben seeks to recognize “a new level of consistency of the 
human experience” (Agamben, 2013: 87).
 If the similarity between commodity exchange and the Franciscan form-
of-life is grounded on the indistinction between practice and being, the main 
difference appears in the case of the “third thing” which this indistinction allows 
for:	the	practice	of	consumption,	in	the	first	case,	and	the	practice	of	“use”,	in	
the latter. The use-value of a given commodity relies on its material properties, 
that is, on that dimension of its being which withstands the exclusion from 
the circuit of exchange - what the social practice conditioned by the form of 
value produces is not something to be used, so much as the commensurability 
between heterogeneous “usables”. On the other hand, insofar as the 
indistinction between rule and life in the form-of-life does not so much allow 
for	the	existence	of	the	formal	normative	dimension,	but	for	the	vivification	of	
the rule - its interpenetration with the practice both follows and is in exception 
to the rule - it is rather the social being itself, the “new form of consistency” it 
allows for, which is given to be enjoyed. In short: commodity fetishism allows 
us to make a living out of the exchange of what we use, while the Franciscan 
form-of-life allows us to make use of a way of living. And why is this form of use 
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something distinct from consumption? Because it cannot be appropriated (ibid: 
143): were I to remove myself from the social practice in order to enjoy this life 
on my own, this life itself would be lost, the very consistency of the thing I desire 
to	use	would	be	lost,	for	it	would	no	longer	be	the	vivified	liturgy	it	just	was.
 A constituted practice that is constitutive of a formal life - such seems to 
be the core of the Franciscan invention: to put the point of indistinction between 
(real) practice and (abstract) rule into work by conceiving of a way of life in 
which this useless element of the social form - which we have called a thought 
- becomes a new and communal form of use, distinct from the use value (use 
subsumed under the commodity form). In this sense, Agamben’s study of the 
form-of-life	constitutes	a	first	step	in	our	investigation	of	what	it	would	mean	to	
discern an idea whose very rational ground depends on the institution of a given 
communal practice: such an idea could only be used, but not appropriated. 
 Our initial wager has been that there are ideas which are only thinkable 
on the condition of a practical engagement with certain forms of institutional 
organization.	This	led	us,	as	a	first	step,	to	examine	the	notion	of	real	abstraction	
at play in commodity fetishism. As we have shown, Marx’s analysis of the form 
of value hinges on two operations: (a) an indiscernibility between thought and 
social being, insofar as the value-relation which abstracts from all concrete 
determination of the commodities being compared (their social being) is 
indistinguishable from the act of comparing two commodities in order for the 
first	to	get	its	immaterial	value	expressed	as	the	material	body	of	the	other	
(making value thinkable); and (b) a de-centrement of this coincidence in regards 
to thought, for the site where “being and thinking are the same” only takes place 
negatively: it is not what we, as participants of the act of exchange, think, but 
rather the thought implicated in the very social form of our practices. 
 This initial investigation led us to recognize that “there is a kind of 
reality whose very ontological consistency implies a certain non-knowledge 
of its participants” (Zizek, 1989: 15) - that is, social being is conditioned by an 
abstraction which it also produces, but this thought takes place outside, and 
despite, of us.
 But if the concept of real abstraction does in fact allow us to verify 
a fundamental aspect of our initial hypothesis, it nevertheless falls short of 
providing us with any insight as to the possibility of turning the disjunction 
between our engagement with a social form and the form of thought it 
produces itself into something useful for everyone. In order to think such a novel 
form of use, whose object is precisely the point of indistinction between the 
consistency of a practice and that of its thought, we then turned to Agamben’s 
study of the Franciscan form-of-life. 
 By turning to the relation between rule and life, as a reformulation of the 
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question of thought and being in social practices, we have also turned to a social 
structure	which	verifies	operations	(a)	and	(b),	described	above,	in	a	clearly	
institutional realm - in opposition to a more general and diffuse concept of 
sociality. This is an important step, because one of the possible ways to negate 
the validity of our hypothesis would be not to so much to deny it, but rather 
to trivialize it, claiming that this is such a fundamental characteristic of ideas in 
general that it is a mere platitude to insist on this property as a special case. It is 
therefore	crucial	to	affirm	that	we	do	not	simply	mean	that	ideas	are	inherently	
dependent on the socio-historical fabric of the time in which they are born, a 
thesis which would indeed be somewhat trivial, but rather that certain consistent 
thoughts are conditioned by particular institutional forms of organization, 
forms which can be constructed and which have, therefore, a duration: social 
structures which begin, endure, and possibly end. Our thesis does not concern 
sociality as such so much as one’s engagement with a localized collective 
practice, such as the one organized by the monastic rules of the Franciscans - or 
by a Communist Party.
	 However,	this	clarification	only	opens	up	the	field	for	a	much	more	precise	
interrogation of our hypothesis: we could very well accept that consistent and 
rational ideas are dependent upon the basic tenets of sociality, because the 
resources for rationality are indeed indistinguishable from those of language 
- this would be the “trivialized” hypothesis - but how could it be the case that 
structures built upon these resources, that a submission to rules which we could 
otherwise suspend, might affect the space of what is thinkable? 
§ 3
In order to recognize Agamben’s own contribution to this problem, we might 
reformulate this division between a “constitutive” and an “instituted” social 
space in terms of the difference between survival and life. 
 Let us take up the following distinction, already proposed by Marx: at 
the constitutive level of our capitalist sociality, to survive and to live cannot 
be immediately distinguished - or better: only value presents the auto-poetic 
and transformative form of living proper (the “organic unity” of capital). The 
consequence of a mode of production where the organization of labor is 
mediated by the value form is that the concrete activity of men is directed by 
the reproduction of life, that is, their animal survival, while the abstract and 
universal quality of labor, the generic capacity of this transformative potency, 
is placed at the service of the production of surplus-value. In other words, the 
“what” and “how” of our laboral activities is determined by the market (we 
work on what will allow us to continue to exist) while the self-relating, self-
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transforming dimension of labor becomes the relation between value and 
valorization (capital). Unlike what is suggested by some accounts of Marxism, 
the domain of “use values” is not exterior to the form of value simply because 
it is the domain of concrete properties of objects - as Marx writes in the very 
first	pages	of	Capital, there is a history of use (“the discovery of these ways 
and hence of the manifold uses of things is the work of history” (Marx,1976: 
125)) so that utility and usefulness are not unaffected by the different modes of 
production and intercourse which mediate their intelligibility as uses. Another 
way of putting it is to say that the form of use defined by its opposition to 
the abstract is a historically determined form of relation between man and 
things that is as much mediated by the form of value as the relation between 
commodities. This is why no plea for a return to “concrete” things truly manages 
to point a way out of the capitalist economical form. Furthermore, the recently 
developed theory of the general intellect as the immanent (immediate) 
production of something common, a theory which relies heavily on a particular 
fragment of Marx’s Grundrisse, equally misses the point: the fact that knowledge 
is potentially available to all, insofar as the knowledge-commodity presents an 
inherent tension with the property-form which encloses it, does not mean that 
the access to this knowledge brings about a new form-of-life - it is perfectly 
possible to have access to something and still be unable to participate in it. The 
theory of general intellect as a recuperation of the “generic life” of man equally 
confuses having access to the use-value of knowledge (its consumption for 
the reproduction of an expanded or more complex form of survival) with the 
effective capacity to “live by” ideas in the sense Agamben touches upon in his 
theory of forms: to give something of ourselves in the ruled processes that allow 
ideas to consist.
 We see, thus, that in Agamben’s theory of forms-of-life, it is not only 
a new concept of form that is at stake (one in which rules participate in the 
constitution of what there is to be enjoyed) but also of a new concept of 
life. This is not life as what exists privately, in man’s relation to himself and 
to his needs, but rather as the access to a sort of fragile fruition - locally, but 
collectively constructed - which adds nothing to the existence and reproduction 
of people, and which cannot be owned (it is collectively produced through rule-
following), cannot be consumed (it is not a concrete thing whose properties 
could be depleted or destroyed) and corresponds to no particular need of any 
particular person.
 Marx himself, in his Parisian Manuscripts, writes of a situation which 
directly resonates with Agamben’s proposal:
In order to supersede the idea of private property, the idea of 
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communism is enough. In order to supersede private property as it 
actually exists, real communist activity is necessary. History will give 
rise to such activity, and the movement which we already know in 
thought to be a self-superseding movement will in reality undergo 
a	very	difficult	and	protracted	process.	But	we	must	look	upon	it	as	
a real advance that we have gained, at the outset, an awareness of 
the limits as well as the goal of this historical movement and are in a 
position to see beyond it.
 When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim 
is instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time, they acquire a 
new need – the need for society – and what appears as a means had 
become an end. This practical development can be most strikingly 
observed in the gatherings of French socialist workers. Smoking, 
eating, and drinking, etc., are no longer means of creating links 
between people. Company, association, conversation, which in turn 
has society as its goal, is enough for them. The brotherhood of man is 
not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth 
upon	us	from	their	work-worn	figures	(Marx	1974:	302)		
Let us work through this passage in some detail. First of all, Marx distinguishes 
the “idea” from the “real activity”: the idea of private property from its actual 
existence, the idea of communism from its real movement. As usual with 
Marx, this is not merely a distinction of registers, between the abstract and 
the concrete presentation of a given thing. The idea of communism can in fact 
work against the real communist movement, insofar as, from the standpoint 
of an idea that has no effective reality, “the real estrangement of human life 
remains and is all the greater the more one is conscious of it as such” (ibidem). 
The actual communist movement, however, does not overcome the actual 
relations mediated by private property so easily as its ideal version: communist 
practice,	in	reality,	moves	slowly,	step	by	step,	it	undergoes	“a	very	difficult	
and protracted process”. But Marx suggests that the very shift away from the 
abstract realm of the idea to the harsh reality of concrete struggle is already 
“real advance”: being aware of “the limits as well as the goal of this historical 
movement”	constitutes	our	first	victory	as	communists.	There	is	a	great	sense	
of pragmatic realism here, a true conviction that being exposed to our real 
limitations is preferable to being trapped in a dream of great things, without 
actuality. 
 The second paragraph, however, introduces a strange twist into this 
orientation. Marx stops speaking of communist strategy in general terms and 
turns to the “communist workmen” gathered together for the purposes of 
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accomplishing some tasks of importance for the political movement: agitation, 
propaganda,	political	formation.	This	active	movement,	a	painfully	difficult	
process of liberation - which is a hundred times more important than the 
work of philosophers, seating home, aloof, thinking of the idea of freedom - is 
nonetheless suddenly interrupted or distorted by the appearance of “a new 
need”. This new need has a very peculiar structure, because, unlike the “real 
estrangement of human life”, which can only be superseded by the actual 
overcoming	of	private	property,	it	can	find	satisfaction	in	the	present,	in	the	very	
process of socialization of workers. This new need, which is produced by the 
very formal dimension of the organization, the forming of workers, inverts the 
relation between means and ends: rather than organize in order to accomplish 
certain tasks of interest for the movement, the communist workmen take part in 
the harsh struggle for actual communism so that they can engage in “smoking, 
eating and drinking”. In a sense, they become, in their pleasure in “company, 
association, conversation”, like the lazy philosophers Marx had just criticized, 
who think of communism for the pleasure of thinking. However, here, the free 
association of men, unlike in the case of the philosopher, freely associating 
ideas, is a reality. A reality which Marx emphatically praises, even though it does 
not present itself as an effective contribution to the actually existing communist 
movement.
 This “new need”, which takes the form of a new satisfaction, an uncalled 
for pleasure, makes a sudden and unwanted appearance here. From the 
standpoint of those who, having abandoned the narcissistic satisfaction of 
wallowing in the ideal, dedicate themselves to the actual communist practice, 
with all its grit and frustrations, to suddenly have their hard-earned efforts of 
collective mobilization turned into a “mere” means for people to gather and talk 
can only be experienced as a deviation, a stoppage or even a betrayal. But they 
are powerless against it. As Jacques Rancière puts it:
Here is the problem that is likely to transform the enthusiasm of 
the communist into the despair of the revolutionary - the nobility 
of humanity already shining on brows that should have lost even 
the appearance of it in order to produce the future of humanity. [..] 
The obstacle to the transformation of Straubinger communists into 
revolutionary proletarians is not their status as artisans, but their status 
as communists - not the heavy weight of their journeyman past but 
the lightness of their anticipation of the communist future (Rancière, 
2003: 82-3)  
Without	a	theory	of	this	“vivified”	dimension	of	collective	organization	which	
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serves no need which pre-existed its formation - that is, without a practical place 
for this strange short-circuit between means and ends - it becomes impossible 
to prevent the insistent and recurring split within the revolutionary movement, 
a split between those moving in the direction of a future transformation of 
society, and those who, having suddenly been exposed to this “new need - the 
need for society”, relish in its present satisfaction. 
 Rancière has dedicated much of his work to the question of the status of 
knowledge within such organizations. Both in his Proletarian Nights as well as 
in	the	specific	case	of	Jacotot,	in	the	Ignorant Schoolmaster, the philosopher 
studies the relation between the constitution of a space where progress towards 
an end is suspended and the sort of intellectual capacity that was formed by 
this collective suspension. In the case of Jacotot, Rancière speaks of the space 
created with this “new need” as the forming of a “circle of power”:
The circle of powerlessness is always already there: it is the very 
workings of the social world, hidden in the evident difference between 
ignorance and science. The circle of power, on the other hand, 
can only take effect by being made public. But it can only appear 
as a tautology or an absurdity. How can the learned master ever 
understand that he can teach what he doesn’t know as successfully as 
what he does know? He cannot but take that increase in intellectual 
power as a devaluation of his science. And the ignorant one, on his 
side, doesn’t believe himself capable of learning by himself, much 
less of being able to teach another ignorant person. Those excluded 
from the world of intelligence themselves subscribe to the verdict of 
their exclusion. In short, the circle of emancipation must be begun 
(Ranciere, 1991:16) 
However, what does it mean to “begin” such a process? For Rancière, it 
means,	first	of	all,	a	collective	engagement	with	the	affirmation	of	a	form	of	
equality. Not a positive equality, like the positing of people’s equal capacity 
to accomplish some task, to learn some given content, etc, but rather a 
negative one: instead of the indelible inequality before knowledge (for some 
men do know more than others), Rancière focuses on the axiomatic equality 
of men before any man’s ignorance. This can be translated into the following 
proposition: a man that cannot transmit to others what he knows, does not 
know. If a man desires to know something, he then equally desires for someone 
else to be able to verify that he knows. Within the “circle of power’, those 
involved are not treated as if they carry knowledge that they were previously 
unaware of, some hidden content waiting to be shared, but begin to partake in 
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a form through which their ignorance can be put to use: if one desires to learn 
something, he will demand a master not because he needs someone to teach 
him, because he needs someone who knows more than him, but rather because 
he needs someone who, in the process of being taught by him, will be in position 
to verify that he in fact came to know. The circle of power is therefore the 
circle where ignorance is itself formed into a potency. And, accordingly, one 
of the principal consequences of this strange association between collective 
engagement and intellectual effort is that the question of the content of a given 
knowledge becomes secondary to the form in which this knowledge is acquired:
[Jacotot’s] problem wasn’t the instruction of the people: one 
instructed the recruits enrolled under one’s banner, subalterns who 
must be able to understand orders, the people one wanted to govern 
- in the progressive way, of course, without divine right and only 
according to the hierarchy of capacities. His own problem was that of 
emancipation: that every common person might conceive his human 
dignity, take the measure of his intellectual capacity, and decide 
how	to	use	it.	(...)	whoever	teaches	without	emancipating	stultifies.	
And whoever emancipated doesn’t have to worry about what the 
emancipated person learns. He will learn what he wants, nothing 
maybe. He will know he can learn because the same intelligence is at 
work in all the productions of the human mind” (Ranciere, 1991: 18)
Rancière	finds	in	the	workers’	circles	-	places	where	the	very	intellectual	
empowerment of the poor made them uninteresting for the revolutionaries, who 
were rather interested in raising “class consciousness” - a secular embodiment 
of Agamben’s Franciscan organizations. A circle of power is, quite precisely, 
a form-of-life where living - one’s human dignity - is indistinguishable from 
form	-	from	the	collective	affirmation	of	ignorance’s	power	-	and	where	this	
indistinction,	finally,	is	available	for	each	participant	to	“decide	how	to	use	it”.	
 What remains unclear is the connection between this negative moment 
- the potency of ignorance, after all, is not yet an idea - and its collective 
consequences. Rancière himself, following Jacotot, stops short of developing 
this next step, as both of them consider this “new need” produced by the circle 
to revert, in the next moment, to the private sphere of each separate individual. 
It is true that there is a moment of collective mediation - it takes at least two 
ignorant men for learning without a teacher to take place - but each decides 
on their own how to use this potency in a way that is not indebted to the form 
which preceded it. Neither Rancière nor Jacotot believe the circle to have 
institutional consistency, nor that the duration of this collective endeavor could 
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condition the access to what it has made possible. 
§ 4
One of the reasons for this limitation is that, for Rancière, the process of 
emancipation prompted by this engagement renders all knowledge indifferent: 
an emancipated man “will learn what he wants, nothing maybe”. While this is 
true - an organization where ignorance is the common measure, rather than 
knowledge, truly has no way of determining what one should, could or must 
learn - there is still another domain in which knowledge and thinking might be 
at stake, a domain we have debated in the very beginning of our study: that 
of the social form itself. A circle which suspends its aims must also suspend 
any determination of what one must know or think, but in order to exist, such 
a circle must itself be an embodiment of a form of thought. After all, there 
are collectives which are incapable of surviving the suspension of their future 
goals, which cannot function without an operating ideal, while others, such as 
Rancière’s “circles of power”, insist in the absence of such an orientation. In this 
distinction, there are different ways of abstracting at stake - on the one hand, 
groups that abstract from their ignorance to focus on their common knowledge, 
on the other, collectives that abstract from what they know in order to turn 
ignorance into a common potency. 
 What this means is that, in order to understand the new place of thinking 
in a circle where a certain indifference to thought is promoted, we need a theory 
of ideas which would allow us to state that, while the individual participants of 
a collective might be busy with their private concerns, the very institution they 
compose goes on thinking.
 There is perhaps no other philosopher today more equipped to 
supplement our Zizekian theory of social forms - of collective forms in which 
there is thought outside of thinking subjects - than Alain Badiou and his theory 
of political ideas. 
 For Badiou, thinking is not a particularly conscious or unconscious activity 
- its principal property is to produce and maintain an immanent indifference 
to its given domain. This does not in fact contradict the Freudian theory of the 
unconscious, for the unconscious is nothing but the fact of an indistinction, 
attesting	to	the	lack	of	determinate	difference	(a	signifier)	between	the	
sexes. Nor does it exclude the possibility that there be conscious thinking - in 
certain cases, one might very well experience such localized indifference but, 
ontologically,	this	would	be	rather	accidental.	But	this	definition	of	thought	
also applies to domains that are simply heterogeneous to the scale and form 
of	individual	consciousness:	scientific	texts,	artistic	works,	inventions	of	love	
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and political organizations. There is nothing preventing us from stating that 
a collective organization thinks - even though the thought implicated in 
such a being might not be homogenous to the thought of any of those who 
compose it. Different forms of organization answer to particular and concrete 
organizational problems, to quite material challenges, just like Jacotot’s circle 
was an experimental answer to the problem “can there be learning without the 
positing of the inequality of intelligences?”. The limitation of Rancière’s theory is 
to assume that this answer was to be found in the thinking of the participants of 
the circle, rather than on the circle itself as a social form of thinking.
 What is equally important for us, however, is that Badiou associates his 
theory of “immanent ideas” to the distinction between survival and life, which 
we have already explored. That is, the “signal” at the individual level of the 
participation in an idea is not the conscious apprehension of this thought, but 
rather the transformation of survival into a life worth living - a live “according 
to an Idea”. In opposition to survival, which for Badiou - as for Marx - means the 
domain of the reproduction of individual human beings, in whatever degree of 
complexity these might take, to live means “to participate, point by point, in the 
organization of a new body, in which a faithful subjective formalism comes to 
take root”. (Badiou, 2009: 35). But in order to understand how life and form are 
related	in	his	account,	we	must	briefly	attend	to	the	concepts	of	formalism and 
participation.
	 While	Agamben	talks	about	forms	mostly	with	the	juridical	field	in	view,	
that is, in terms of norms and rules, Badiou thinks formalism from the standpoint 
of mathematical activity - but what is gained in this shift? For our purposes here, 
it	suffices	to	realize	that	a	juridical	rule	has	a	reach	bound	by	a	given	community	
- it is a form based on a constitutive difference, which is why the French 
philosopher Lyotard, studying the problem of rule-following and juridical norms, 
coined the term differend, to name the fundamental impasse that takes place in 
the encounter between two “different differences”, the impossibility to translate 
the rules of a community into the rules of another. Mathematical formalism, on 
the other hand, is essentially a set of rules bound by indifference - indifference 
to consciousness (it can contradict our intuitions), to community (its deductive 
power does not respect particular customs) and even to the physical world 
(there are consistent formal systems with no natural models at all). This does 
not mean that Badiou considers all formalism to be mathematical, but rather 
that only a concept of formalism based on indifferentiation could also apply to 
mathematics - it is the most general concept of formalism. 
	 The	importance	of	this	definition	of	formalism	for	Badiou’s	theory	of	life	
shines forth if we remember Marx’s discussion, in the Manuscripts of 1844, on the 
transformative and universal dimension of human practice, that dimension which 
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exists only as capital when human practice is mediated by value as a social 
form.	For	Marx,	the	generic	life	of	man,	that	which	truly	defines	what	it	means	
to live, is one’s capacity to participate in the universal, in the transformation 
of the very concept of what it means to be human. In a sense, the generic 
is the inhuman in man, or at least the not-yet-human, for it concerns those 
activities and productions which fall outside the current concept of humanity. 
By thinking forms from the standpoint of their indifference to a given situation, 
Badiou is in fact connecting the capacity of formal experiments to exceed 
what in-forms them - formalism’s negative universality - back to Marx’s theory 
of genericity, which was, all along, the Marxian theory of a true life. In short, it 
is only by participating in forms which exceed their own material - exceed the 
confines	of	a	community,	an	experience,	a	consciousness	-	that	people	have	
access to a life that is not mere survival. Rancière’s description of the “circle 
of power” falls short of properly accounting for the experience it investigates 
- the experience of partaking in the “new need” recognized by Marx’s analysis 
of the inversion of means and ends in certain workingmen’s organizations - 
because it thinks emancipation solely in regards to what people are freed from 
- freed from teachers, freed from inequality - and, from that standpoint, nothing 
might come from paying attention to the organization which promoted this 
emancipation, since considering this institutional dimension a conditional form 
for this experience would mean binding the “unbinding” back into something, 
and therefore losing it. Badiou’s theory, however, thinks emancipation also as 
freedom to accomplish something - that is, freedom to participate in an Idea. 
 This participation, as we have mentioned in passing, is nonetheless not 
the same as conscious apprehension, sentiment, or even personal experience. 
Let us recall that, in Plato’s theory of “participation” (metaxu), developed 
through several of his later dialogues, this term is evoked as a way to explain the 
relation between the sensible and the realm of idealities, the relation between 
the local case and the general form. A given chair “participates” in the idea 
of Chair - its multiple being is seen as ‘one’ from the standpoint of the Idea of 
which it partakes. This could lead us to assume that “to participate in an Idea”, 
in the case of a political organization, would mean to treat the actual concrete 
organization as the local case, and our apprehension of it, or our imagination 
of its ideal version, as the form - but what we get is rather the opposite: the 
organization itself, in the indifferent or negative universality of the formalism 
it embodies, is rather what carries traits of the general or generic idea, and 
those who are formed by it - workers, ignorant men, etc - are the multiple 
unified	from the standpoint of the social formation. Participation becomes, for 
Badiou, the name of an immanent mediation between two regions of the world, 
a set of determined beings and a practical formalism which in-differs from its 
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determined situation.
When Marx describes the congregation of French socialist workers, gathered 
for	the	purpose	of	“instruction,	propaganda,	etc”,	but,	strangely	satisfied	by	
“company, association, conversation”, their apparent lack of revolutionary 
goals should not deceive us: they might be occupied with “smoking, eating and 
drinking”, but the organization composed by them goes on thinking. It is from 
the standpoint of this form that “the nobility of man shines forth upon us from 
their	work-worn	figures”
§ 5
It is important to realize that Rancière’s investigations on the workers’ circles 
in	the	eighteenth	century	were	carried	out	as	a	response	to	a	first	-	and	failed	-	
attempt to take creative revolutionary thinking in Europe out of the university 
and back into militant organizations. That is, Rancière was answering to the 
practical failure of Louis Althusser’s effort to reverse the consolidated tendency 
which had displaced critical thinking from political organizations into academia. 
 In schematic terms, there has been an observable shift in the site of 
elaboration of political theory in the Left before and after the Second World 
War. If the beginning of the century saw a profusion of thinkers whose ideas 
were deeply connected with the political processes in which they took part - 
consider, for example, the relation between different theoretical positions of 
Russian revolutionaries and their practical engagements before and after the 
Bolshevik revolution, or Lukacs’ (best) theoretical work and its connection 
to the struggles of the Communist Party of Hungary in the 20s - the rise of 
fascism brought about a novel dissociation between political thinking and 
political engagement. Many important and creative thinkers turned their political 
engagements towards armed combat and resistance against the fascist threat, 
while at some point securing academic positions at universities which could 
guarantee them some basic stability during such dark and troublesome times. 
Furthermore, the increasing visibility of the atrocities taking place in the Soviet 
Union, plus the dissolution of the Third International, also led people away 
from Communist Parties and in search of a place where critical thinking - and 
criticisms	of	party	politics	-	could	properly	flourish.	The	paradigmatic	case	
of this trend was, perhaps, that of the Frankfurt School, which even gave an 
institutional form to this division between political militancy and critical thinking, 
but it is a division that lives on until today, usually taking the form of critical 
thinking directed against the ossifying, alienating and militaristic effects of 
collective organization in general.
 Althusser, who also fought in the war and later established himself 
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as a philosophy professor at the university, did nonetheless contribute 
to the inversion of this movement. The force for this alternative route, 
which distinguished him and his students from the well-established Marxist 
intelligentsia	of	the	times,	was	surely	the	influence	of	Maoism,	which	inflated	
new life into the theory of party politics and into theory in general, through its 
commitment to a conception of practice as the origin of “correct ideas”. And 
the palpable effects of this commitment can truly be felt in Althusser’s method 
and thinking: not only did he establish an unusually horizontalist interlocution 
with his students - informally developing a methodology of work that would 
accompany him for all his life, informing his writing and style - but the very 
consolidation of his theoretical project, with the publication of Reading Capital 
(1968), was itself a collective endeavor. This tendency to infuse theoretical work 
with a collective form was also apparent elsewhere: Althusser was one of the 
few Marxists of his time who remained faithful to both the French Communist 
Party and to the idea that Marxist “concrete analysis of concrete situations” 
should also apply to militant institutions themselves. These two Althusserian 
intuitions	-	firstly,	promoting	collective	research	projects,	and,	secondly,	positing	
critique from within rather than outside institutions - can be understood as 
the cornerstone upon which a return of thinking to political organizations is 
conditioned.
 However, it is interesting to note that even if Althusser helped to 
demonstrate the need for a new form of association between collective 
practice and critical thinking, the actual consolidation of a group based on 
this Althusserian principle did not include him. The Cercle d’Epistemologie, 
composed of some of his most brilliant students, was conceived outside strict 
academic	confines,	taking	upon	itself	the	task	of	editing	an	innovative	journal	
of politics, philosophy and psychoanalysis called the Cahiers pour l’Analyse, 
in which the basis for a new theory of discursivity was to be collectively 
elaborated. Unfortunately, the journal as well as the Cercle did not survive the 
intense political activity of the end of the sixties in France: insofar as the project 
was mostly organized around a sophisticated theoretical production, with no 
clear view of its own institutional or political stakes, it could not withstand the 
sort of tensioned association between students and workers that characterized 
militant experimentation in that historical sequence. Even though the members 
of the Cercle d’Epistemologie have mostly explained the group’s disintegration 
in terms of their different positions towards the political movement in France 
- some displaying a more strict to Maoism, others much less so - it is clear 
that the very form of the project revealed itself to be detached from the 
organizational challenges of its time (Hallward & Peden, 2012). Simultaneous 
to the development of the Cercle, however, there was also the foundation of 
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Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic School, the École Freudienne de Paris, arguably 
the greatest experiment in collective organization in France at the time. Lasting 
from the mid-sixties to the early eighties, the EFP was a project that, curiously 
enough, also counted with the presence of Althusser both in its beginning and 
its termination (Tupinambá & Yao, 2013: 405-435) . Leaving aside the many 
merits and failures of this endeavor - which would deserve a full analysis in its 
own right (Hamza ed, 2015: 159) - we should not underestimate its importance 
to the shift of investment which led some of the most active members of the 
Cercle away from their own collective and towards the construction of the 
School. This fact is noteworthy because it reveals how some of the missing 
elements	in	the	Althusserian	“scientific”	view	of	collectivity	were	perhaps	
to be found in the debates over the collective organization of Lacanian 
psychoanalysts at the time (Tupinambá & Yao, 2013).
 Rancière was not part of the Cercle - even though he had taken 
part, alongside some of them, in Althusser’s Reading Capital project a few 
years before - but we can easily understand his conceptual turn away from 
Althusserian themes and towards the archives of the worker’s movements as 
a response to the failure, of both his master and his peers, to jointly articulate 
collective engagement and thinking. Rancière’s work, from La Leçon d’Althusser 
(1975) up to Le Maître Ignorant	(1987),	has	been	usually	read	as	a	fierce	critique	
of the fetishization of the working class by the revolutionary movement - which 
it	mostly	definitely	is.	As	Rancière	demonstrates,	specially	in	his	Le Philosophe et 
ses pauvres (1983), the paradigm of production in certain Marxist trends leads to 
a fetishization of the worker that effectively prevents equality from ever taking 
place	amongst	comrades.	But	we	also	find	in	these	studies	the	basis	for	an	
alternative theory of thinking that is indissociable from collective organization. 
As	we	have	already	discussed	previously	in	this	text,	Rancière	finds	in	Joseph	
Jacotot’s “universal method of emancipation” a theory that binds the engaged 
wager on equality with the creation of a space for learning. However, as we have 
also seen, neither Jacotot nor Rancière take the additional step of conceiving 
the experience of the emancipatory workers’ circles as the basis for a new form 
of	organization:	for	both	of	them	the	engagement	with	this	affirmation,	albeit	
tying one person to another through a common ignorance, does not constitute a 
durable social link.
 It is within this long history of failed or incomplete attempts to associate 
collective organization and creative thinking that the Circle of Studies of Idea 
and Ideology (CSII) seeks to inscribe itself as yet another precarious step 
forward.
 The Circle was created in 2012 with the aim of incorporating the lessons 
extracted from these previous experiments into the ongoing movement of re-
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connecting collective engagement with theoretical production, in a renewed 
attempt to both challenge and revitalize the party-form under contemporary 
conditions. In its guiding document, the Circle refers its own name back to four 
crucial tasks that fall upon any attempt to work through the conjunction of 
thinking and partisanship today, connecting these challenges to four thinkers we 
have already mentioned here:
(1) The construction of a Circle which distinguishes between two parts 
within a political party – one transitive dimension, focused on the 
specific	demands	of	the	world	as	it	is,	and	an	intransitive	dimension	
that, from the point of view of the world, doesn’t answer to any 
specific	demand	–	must	be	able	to	distinguish	between	a	political	
dimension driven by finality and another one guided by uselessness. 
Thus, the construction of the space of the Circle depends of our 
capacity to know what is a community without a purpose.This task is 
named by Giorgio Agamben.
 (2) A Circle of Studies, whose emblem proposes the articulation of 
thought with militancy, has the duty of transforming its own operation 
into an example of this approach. Thus, it is necessary to invent a 
concept of study that makes possible a productive use of mastery – 
setting power at service of knowledge – as well as asserting a method 
of work capable of establishing a bond between the participants based 
on common problems – producing power from the vicissitudes of 
knowledge. This task is named by Jacques Rancière.
 (3) A Circle of Studies of the Idea – a space dedicated to the 
invention of a concrete institution, but whose constructive principle 
is	something	that	does	not	exist	yet	–	needs	to	be	able	affirm	that	
practice can be oriented by what is inexistent and indistinguishable 
from a thought. In other words, it is necessary to investigate in what 
way can politics be understood as the incarnation of an Idea. This task 
is named by Alain Badiou.
 (4) A Circle of Studies of Idea and Ideology cannot, however, 
stop questioning the difference between the work of transforming 
the world and the expenditure of energy invested on repeating our 
current coordinates. That is, we need to conceive how the existing 
social bonds might be further tightened by our efforts to break them, 
and, from this investigation, think about what would be a political 
intervention irreducible to the ideological processes that put the will 
of change into the service and maintenance of the present. This task is 
named	by	Slavoj	Žižek.	(CSII,	2016)
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These four points are then summarized in the following wager:
At	the	crossroads	of	their	philosophical	projects,	we	find	one	of	the	
most radical attempts to produce a new formulation of the communist 
hypothesis,	as	well	as	its	most	courageous	reaffirmation,	by	the	shared	
premise that the opaque core of what is common – the uselessness, 
the ignorance, the inexistent and the symptom – is also what links 
thought and militancy (CSII, 2016)
§ 6
The Circle of Studies of Idea and Ideology explicitly takes upon itself the task of 
continuing an experimentation which, in fact, has not been conceived as such 
by	its	own	precursors.	In	the	previous	section	we	have	briefly	sketched	the	
genealogy of the problem and introduced the Circle’s	affirmation	of	belonging	
to the experimental history of articulations between organization and thinking. 
In this section we will concentrate on describing some of the formal mechanisms 
which characterize the group’s functioning.
 CSII’s composition has become increasingly complex in the last few 
years. Currently, it is a collective which counts with more than 50 members, 
spread around more than 5 countries, working alongside political parties and 
trade unions in Brazil, organizing academic events in different countries, book 
translations, study groups, experimenting with the use of psychoanalysis in 
political strategic thinking, as well engaging with different militant activities. 
Still, this complexity is supported by a few formal mechanisms that guarantee 
the Circle’s basic unity. What interests us in our brief analysis of this collective 
is to understand in which sense this unity can truly be based on “the opaque 
core of what is common”: that is, we are interested in the concrete collective 
experiment the Circle has produced through its appropriation of the theoretical 
resources presented thus far. 
 Let us take a look at four different aspects of this formal structure: how to 
enter the Circle, how to stay in, how to position oneself in it, and how to make 
its failures productive.
(A) Entry
In	order	to	join	the	group,	one	has	to	fill	in	an	admittance	form,	divided	into	two	
sections: one demanding objective information about the candidate, another 
asking for the proponent to write a commentary on the Circle’s project. The 
submitted form, however, is not evaluated by the members of the collective 
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based	on	its	content,	or	even	based	on	the	political	identifications	of	the	
candidate:	rather,	what	is	evaluated	is	whether	the	form	has	been	filled	in	a	way	
that de-authorizes it. For example, some candidates, when faced with the need 
to submit to a formal entry procedure, seem to feel obliged to write in their 
forms that they do not believe in admittance forms, either by explicitly stating it, 
or by leaving parts of the form simply blank. In those cases, the Circle evaluates 
the form negatively - and an email is sent back to the candidate, explicitly 
stating the reasons for refusal and inviting her to submit a new form. In every 
other case, regardless of the content of the comments submitted, the form is 
accepted. 
 In this sense, the admittance form functions a bit like the “door of the 
Law” in Kafka’s parable: it looks like an examination will take place - and many 
people do in fact become paralyzed before the obscurely simple criteria of 
entry - but the only wrong answer is to dismiss the examination as illegitimate. 
This is an essential condition, nonetheless: were the Circle to approve everyone 
indistinctively, its entry form would be a mere formality, but insofar as the very 
fact	of	legitimately	filling	it	creates	the	object	to	be	positively	evaluated	in	the	
group’s voting process, the admittance form becomes part of a formalism - 
that is, the object under analysis is not the external referent represented by the 
written form (who the applicant is, his political beliefs and so on), but what the 
form	itself	creates,	its	most	superficial	and	internal	consistency.
(B) Permanence
However, the entry form is not the determining operator of belonging in 
the Circle’s logic. Rather than deriving consistency from a mechanism that 
distinguishes the inside from the outside of the collective, CSII relies on a 
different protocol which privileges the connection of one meeting to the next: 
the work note. 
 Once someone is accepted into the Circle, the only necessary commitment 
of this participant is to write, after every meeting, a short anonymous note - of 
any content whatsoever. Every cell meets on a weekly basis, but one’s presence 
in these meetings is in fact considered secondary to the handing in of the work 
notes: it is the presence of the writing that marks one’s engagement with the 
project, not the physical presence in the meeting space. As written in the Circle’s 
project:
All	work	is	supported	by	the	following	affirmation:	presence	at	
the meetings is not a guarantee of thought – by this we mark the 
distinction between presence and participation. Presence allows 
for the creation of cohesion through a common sense, invariably 
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produced when a group discusses a common subject. Participation, on 
the other hand, is how we can subtract from such cohesion the reason 
for engaging with what resists understanding. The mechanism which 
operates the distinction between presence and participation is the 
work note. (CSII, 2016)
All notes written by the members of a given cell are then gathered together and 
a minimal systematization of these fragments orients the debate and study to 
take place in the following meeting. If a participant fails to hand in four notes 
in a row, the next meeting is cancelled - and if the missing notes are still not 
accounted for, she is then considered to have abandoned the Circle. This is how 
the notes are described in CSII’s project:
The work note is a text without any restriction on theme or size, 
and which must be written both individually and anonymously. The 
anatomy of the work note serves three different functions:
(a)  The work note is a small fragment of individual development
(b)  The work note is the text which guides the direction of the next 
meeting of the cell
(c)  The work note is a marker of discipline, a written seal of regular 
commitment
If the work note is a fragment of elaboration, it is because the one who writes it 
thereby	materially	fixes	his	doubts,	which	can	then	be	assumed	and	worked	on.		
While the work note is an individual undertaking, it is also, as any form of labor, 
a social vector – a well constructed note is one which transforms an individual 
lack of knowledge into a collective lack of knowledge, thereby becoming of use 
for the whole Circle. (CSII, 2016)
 The case of the work notes already gives us a hint of how one might 
operationalize the idea of a “negative mediation” between collective 
organization and thinking. After all, the content of the notes is not prescribed 
anywhere, it is only the formal fact of writing that truly counts as a marker 
of one’s engagement with the collectivity. The heterogeneous content of the 
work notes is thus supplemented by the homogeneous form of commitment it 
allows for. And while the formal discipline of writing the notes guarantees the 
continuation of the cell, the questions, commentaries, criticisms put to writing 
direct the theoretical elaborations of the group without the presupposition of 
consensus amongst its members. 
 Finally, it is interesting to realize that this seemingly simple formal 
discipline - to write down, after every meeting, an anonymous note of any theme 
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and length - is the source of the greatest anxiety for most members. As with 
the case of the entry form, the suspension of any criteria of what should and 
should	not	be	written	creates	an	indeterminate	space	that	is	usually	filled	with	
the participant’s fantasies of what is expected of them, etc. Because of this, the 
work notes become a privileged site, within the organization, where the libidinal 
impasses of organization are enacted. 
 The formal indifference at stake in both the admittance and the 
permanence processes shares some similarities with the “golden rule” of 
psychoanalysis: the rule of free association. In psychoanalysis, the suspension 
of any extrinsic constraints on what the patient should speak of is an essential 
condition for the “realization of the unconscious” (Lacan, 1981) and the 
establishment of transference - for it is precisely in such absence that the 
intrinsic constraints of speech shine forth, rules that command what we can and 
cannot say, even though there is no external ruler demanding us to obey this. 
The production of an agent concretely responsible for these intrinsic deviations 
- someone who knows this imperative that one cannot but obey - is what we 
call transference, and the work of the analyst is to refer the supposition of this 
agency or knowledge back to the speaker, through scansions, interpretations 
and so on. 
 In the Circle, the indeterminate space created by the purely formal 
character of the work notes produces a similar absence, which is equally 
followed by a certain form of transferential work, of displacements and 
suppositions concerning other members and the group itself. This enactment 
or realization of transference ultimately allows the Circle to treat some of its 
obstacles - and the “other” who would be responsible for such interdictions - 
as objects of interpretation, even though there is no one in the position of an 
analyst: as it turns out, the analytic effects in a collective need to be formally 
homogenous with the site of their intervention in order to produce any sort of 
effective transformation, which is why only collective interventions are capable 
of interpreting these symptomatic formations (Hamza & Ruda ed, 2015: 133).
(C) Positions
The constitution of a Circle cell requires that there be at least two people, for 
this is the minimal number necessary for distributing the two basic positions 
which compose its functioning: the “Plus one” and the General Secretary. 
The position of the “Plus one” was invented by Jacques Lacan as a way of 
preventing the work groups in his School - which he called “cartels” - from using 
the	collective	work	as	an	excuse	to	fortify	the	identificatory	traits	between	
the participants of those groups, which would further consolidate the already 
existing “doxa” and hinder the appearance of new ideas (Lacan, 2001: 229-242). 
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In order to avoid this, Lacan proposed that each group would include “plus one” 
member, someone whose principal function would be to provoke the remaining 
members to work through new ideas, relentlessly questioning any collective 
production and thereby preventing them from turning collective work into a 
mechanism	of	confirmation	of	their	own	common	sense.	In	the	Circle, a similar 
mechanism was adopted for every cell, but with an essential variation. This is 
because, contrary to Lacan’s own proposal, the Circle cells are not “project-
oriented”,	that	is,	they	are	not	means	to	a	specific	goal	or	product,	so	that,	
after achieving it or completing a work cycle, the group would disintegrate. 
Since one of the principle tasks of the Circle’s	organization	is	precisely	to	find	a	
possible mediation between duration (militancy) and difference (thinking), some 
adaptations to this position had to be made. 
 First of all, in the Circle, the “Plus One” becomes a position that anyone 
could occupy - it is not connected, as in Lacanian Schools, with a certain degree 
of personal analytic experience. Unlike the “desire for absolute difference” 
(Lacan, 1981: 276) in psychoanalysis, which can only be produced through 
a singular and painstaking analytic process, the position of the “Plus One” 
in the Circle is readily available to all. Why? Because - and this is a second 
transformation of the Lacanian concept - the task of the “Plus One” is not 
conceived as that of provoking elaboration through the dissolution of what is 
common. To understand this, we must only remember that the psychoanalytic 
Schools starts off from homogeneity - for every participant of a “cartel” is a 
psychoanalyst of the same theoretical orientation as the other, so homogeneity 
and consistency are presupposed by the group - and so, in those cases, the 
“Plus One” could only introduce difference against the consolidation of these 
commonalities. Here, however, the group begins from heterogeneity - the Circle 
accepts anyone, with no particular requirements of age, academic background 
or social class - and difference is introduced precisely through the forcing of 
this heterogeneity into a partial synthesis of the collected work notes, that is, 
by being treated as the intersection or common point of the collective. The 
“Plus One” remains, as with Lacan, responsible for keeping common sense in 
check, but not through skepticism or critical punctuations - which would still be 
interventions concerning the content of the notes - but through a formal “short-
circuiting” of seemingly incongruent work notes, exposing the members to a 
collective association of their private ideas. Since this is a formal work - which 
produces not an “absolute difference”, but rather a common indifference - there 
is no personal experience, knowledge or desire required to occupy this place. 
The challenge for desire - the anguish - is rather on the side of the participants, 
who have the boundaries of their private thoughts removed without the excuse 
of any sort of positive communion. In fact, it is up to the members of the cell 
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to interpret any crystallization of the “Plus One” into a master or teacher 
when, faced with the effects of its purely formal work, they seek to credit its 
consequences to a substantial or personalized cause - such as the particularities 
of the participant occupying this position. 
 If the psychoanalytic-inspired position of the “Plus One” has effects, above 
all, on the Circle’s study methodology, the position of the General Secretary 
is specially concerned with the material conditions of existence of the group, 
always seeking to confront the space of thought within the collective with the 
collective effort required to maintain it. The position of Secretary has a long 
tradition in Leftist political organizations, where it is usually conceived as the 
instance that is responsible for the administrative supervision of the institution. 
From this classical conception, the Circle retained the Secretary’s responsibility 
over the administrative functioning and over the material resources of a 
given	cell,	as	well	as	the	understanding	that	this	position	must	be	financially	
remunerated, for it constitutes a labor activity, like any other. In this way, no 
matter how small a Circle cell might be, the question of how to materially 
maintain its space is always kept in view. But the General Secretary of a cell is 
not solely responsible for guaranteeing that the material basis of the group’s 
existence become objects of thought for the participants - by referring back 
to them the problems of logistic, of task division, of payment, etc - but also for 
guaranteeing that every cell remains compatible with whatever other cells that 
exist in the Circle, or that might come to exist. 
 This additional role has been incorporated into the function of the 
Secretary because, unlike the case of the classic form of the revolutionary Party, 
where such a function was originally devised, the Circle does not count with 
consensus or a common knowledge as the basis for its cohesion. Rather, the 
trust	in	the	formal	dimension	of	organization	leads	CSII	to	assume	a	reflexive	
position concerning its own economic and logistical structure. Rather than seek 
universality at the level of a determinate content, it seeks to infuse universality 
into the institution via a formal indifference, that is, by testing if its most 
practical rules of organization are able to accommodate differences in social 
class,	gender,	study,	and	even	political	affiliation.	The	General	Secretary	is	thus	
responsible for de-centering debates and conceptual discussions through the 
intervention of protocols that refer what takes place in a meeting to the very 
formal conditions of the meeting cell itself. This interruption gives the collective 
a chance to treat its own material basis - that which must disappear for a group 
to appear as a naturally-bound organism - as the site of transformations and 
inventions that concern the space of the institution as such. For this purpose, the 
General Secretary supervises the application of a series of protocols, controlling 
the length of the debates and of the collective readings, guaranteeing that 
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all meetings be recorded for posterior access by members of other cells and 
that quoted bibliography and references be made equally available to all - all 
mechanisms devised to guarantee that any given meeting be formally traversed 
by the concern with those who are not present. Most importantly, this position 
is responsible for overseeing the application of the Circle’s methodology 
for deliberative processes - one which determines that any important local 
decisions of a given cell should be put to a vote that includes whatever 
members outside of that cell who wish to participate in that deliberation.
 It is important to note that both the position of the “Plus one” as well as 
that of the Secretary do not substantially contribute to the Circle’s study or 
collective orientation, they merely give form to whatever ideas the collective 
might incorporate. On the one hand, the collected work notes become the 
material for an associative composition that corresponds to the thought of no 
one in particular. On the other, whatever thinking does in fact consolidate itself 
through this formal process is then “put to the test” of providing an orientation 
that can both answer to the practicalities and economic matters of the Circle as 
well as of surviving its exposure to those who have not thought it - both current 
and future members of other cells.
 In this way, whatever any given member thinks on his own, the very 
structure of the Circle guarantees that she will be confronted with two thoughts 
that were thought not by, but through her: the product of the free association of 
particular elaborations after each meeting, brought into play by the “Plus one”, 
and the concrete impasses of collective organization, rendered visible by the 
General Secretary. To assume the former in order to orient oneself in the latter 
is a task whose subject can only be said to be the Circle itself - rather than its 
particular members or even the sum of all of them.
(D) Process
Even if this static presentation of the formal structure of the Circle already 
allows us to discern how it is that one might conceive of a concrete organization 
where thinking takes place at a remove from the thinkers who compose it, 
it is only by considering this structure in its dynamic unfolding that the truly 
essential property of this device comes into view, namely, the capacity of this 
form of organization to recognize thinking not so much in the “positive” excess, 
where the “whole is bigger than the sum of the parts”, but rather in the failures 
of the collective, at those sites where this formal machinery halts or stumbles.
 In order to grasp the Circle’s functioning we must consider at least two 
distinct	temporal	instances:	a	first	one,	where	the	group	meets	in	order	to	
collectively study and debate, and a second one, where this study is applied 
to the maintenance and transformation of the collective itself. The results of 
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this	second	moment	are	then	inscribed	back	into	the	first,	further	orienting	
the direction of the Circle’s theoretical investigations. These two moments 
correspond to two positions taken by the participants of the Circle.	In	the	first	
instant, while concerning themselves with the conceptual apprehension of 
certain ideas, the members participate in the Circle in the form of “thinkers”, 
but no collective thought is taking place - since the collective organization 
merely supports the space for plural debate and elaboration. In the second 
moment, while applying the partial results of their theoretical investigation to 
the concrete problems of the collective, the members contribute to the Circle 
in the form of a “thought”, even though no one counts at that point as thinkers - 
since the problems at stake here are indifferent to whatever conceptual debate 
the participants are involved in. It is only from the temporal standpoint that 
the disjunction between the collection of thinkers - those who compose the 
organization’s thinking - and the collective thinking itself - which is only later at 
the disposal of thinkers - becomes apparent.
	 For	example,	in	a	first	instant,	a	member	of	the	Circle might present to 
the rest of the group a particular theoretical point of his interest - however, 
given the absolute porosity of the entry form to quite heterogenous new 
memberships, the transmission of this particular argument might be restricted 
to solely a few members, perhaps those with a previous background on a given 
topic.	In	a	second	instant	-	which	can	immediately	follow	the	first	-	the	failure	
of transmission is taken as an object of thought: does someone who fails to 
transmit what he knows truly know what he thinks he does? What would have 
to be done differently for that particular argument or presentation to reach 
those members it did not? At this point, the theoretical presentation is no longer 
the sign that there is a thinker in the room, but rather the index of a problem 
for a different sort of thinking, one that concerns both the presenter and the 
remaining participants alike.
	 Another	possible	situation	is	when,	in	a	first	instant,	the	group	decides	to	
participate in a certain practical activity - such as organizing an academic event, 
or regular visits to the suburbs to talk to workers. In a second instant, however, 
the economic conditions for the participation of all the members is brought 
into play: how should the Circle organize its economies so that such an activity 
would not rely on an unfair division of labor, or so that it would not exclude 
those who have no money for transportation from joining in?
 In all these cases, what takes place is not simply the poor application of 
the Circle’s rules, but rather that a well constructed formalism can render useful 
impasses and problems legible, thereby allowing us to experiment new ways out 
of	them.	These	problems	can	sometimes	be	solved	locally,	through	refinements	
in the application of a given principle, but sometimes they actually require 
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the extensive reformulation of both conceptual and practical aspects of CSII’s 
guiding project.
 This brief view of the Circle’s dynamism already allows us to see that 
what truly mediates between these two moments, giving them their common 
ground, is in fact “the opaque core” of the organization. The Circle is bound 
together by the useless dimension of the collective, those aspects that concern 
the mere maintenance of the space, being of no theoretical interest or political 
utility. By the ignorance of its participants - not so much the inequality between 
the members’ knowledge of a given topic, but the fact that everyone is equally 
ignorant of the collective effects of this inequality on the organization itself. 
By the inexistence of the Circle’s very idea - for no separable instance of the 
collective contains its own raison d’etre,	requiring	always	a	further	step	to	find	
its proper function. And by the symptoms which get in the way of this very 
process, when the indeterminate space produced by a thoroughly formal set of 
rules with no particular content comes to be inhabited by the group’s different 
phantasms and attempts to make sense of the collective’s disjunctive structure. 
As we hope to have shown, it is this negative moment - which expresses itself as 
uselessness, as ignorance, as inexistence and as symptomatic formations -  that 
truly oscillates between an obstacle and an object for thought, and and which 
decides if participants are thinking the organization, or being part of the object 
that is practically worked through by the collective form itself. 
§ 7
In the previous section we focused on the internal logic of the Circle’s formal 
mechanisms,	describing	in	detail	some	of	the	basic	rules	that	define	the	
properties of the space discerned by CSII’s practice. In this concluding section, 
we would like to explore a question that members of the Circle often pose to 
themselves, not without some despair: the question of the political usefulness of 
this form. 
	 As	our	previous	presentation	made	quite	clear,	none	of	the	defining	
protocols of the Circle are directed outwards, to the transformation of the world. 
Both the entry form and the work notes inform the consistency of the collective, 
while the “Plus one” and the General Secretary put this consistency to the test 
of conceptual and economic heterogeneity - that is, testing the genericity of this 
consistency. The outside world exists for the Circle,	first	of	all,	as	an opportunity 
to think the universality of its own form. Evidently, the individual members of the 
collective are under the same superegoic pressure to “change the world’ as any 
other political militant or Leftist sympathizer today, and therefore this seemingly 
self-centered - circular? - program is hard to justify, even for themselves.  
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 However, rather than a moral or conceptual defense, this particular mode 
of organization has shown its usefulness in its concrete consequences. 
 The Circle has engaged with political processes in two different ways: 
through activities which require the Circle to operate in accordance to the 
current Leftist tactical logic and through activities which allow CSII to either 
extend or reproduce its own functioning within different organizations and 
contexts.	Let	us	call	the	first	sort	of	engagement	a	“constructivist”	one,	and	the	
second, “investigative”.
 Interestingly enough, the Circle’s constructive engagement usually 
takes place as a response to demands, made either by particular members of 
the collective or by people visiting a meeting, for a concrete “proof” of CSII’s 
political contribution, either as a way to legitimate its existence or as a good 
reason to join the group. As attempts to provide others with such a validation, 
the Circle has joined in street protests, helped with electoral campaigns in Leftist 
parties (both for internal party elections as well as for municipal and national 
campaigns), produced and distributed political pamphlets, participated in base 
party organizations and housing occupations. In all these activities, however, 
a	dual	objective	is	always	at	stake:	to	fulfill	a	given	task	and	to	do	it	in	such	a	
way that the political identity of the Circle	is	clarified	to	some	other	instance	
or institution. This duality is not accidental, it is rather an implicit condition 
of any constructive orientation: a task can only be considered functional for 
a given objective if this objective is known beforehand and the result of the 
task can be compared to this anticipated aim - that is, it will be considered a 
successful transformation if it obtains (an at least approximate version of) the 
ideal that was already known before the practical engagement. This second 
operation, which compares the anticipated ideal and the result of a task, comes 
with certain presuppositions, the most important of all being not to disturb the 
tenets which support the political identity one is trying to belong to through 
this constructive engagement. This means that - leaving aside the arguable 
contribution of these activities to the “accumulation of forces” of the Left - little 
can be expected from these practices in terms of new impasses and problems 
for political thinking: were the Leftist ideals at stake in such an activity be 
shaken by some problem or obstacle, the conclusion one could reach is simply 
that this was a failed activity, or not a Leftist activity at all. This disjunction 
between	identificatory	validation	and	political	problems	-	which	follows	the	logic	
of	the	famous	Lacanian	joke:	“my	fiancée	is	never	late,	because,	if	she	is	late,	
she	is	no	longer	my	fiancée”	-	has	the	consequence	of	rendering	it	impossible	
to learn anything from the Left’s failures, for there is no formal index in these 
failures to allow the Left to recognize itself therein. And, accordingly, the effect 
of such activities for the Circle is usually that there is nothing to preserve 
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from these experiences: tasks are completed, more or less successfully, with 
no strategic clarity gained. Only, perhaps, a sense of belonging to the Left is 
provisionally produced - until the next time the same question is raised once 
more.
 The other sort of activity - one in which the Circle seeks to expand its 
reach, or replicate its own form - does appear as an answer to a call or demand 
for political action, but rather takes place as an invitation to experiment, that is, 
as the organization’s curiosity to test its own universality in a local and concrete 
manner. What is at stake here, then, is not merely the transformation of a given 
situation’s content	-	distributing	flyers	and	pamphlets	where	materially	there	
were none before - but rather transforming the situation’s very form. 
 An example of this sort of investigative practice is the Circle’s work in Rio 
de Janeiro, from 2014 to 2016, trying to organize within the Partido Socialismo 
e Liberdade (PSOL) a political formation course that would cut across the 
radical and aggressive political divergences within PSOL itself - which split 
the Party into two halves that sabotage one another, themselves divided into 
more than 20 different political tendencies. Offering to take care of the logistics 
of the course, the Circle shifted the axis of debate from the ideal content of 
the course - an ideal that no two tendencies in the Party agreed upon - to the 
question of what form this activity should take so that the divergences between 
political ideologies could, rather than be “solved” into a consensus, be in fact 
made indifferent. Directing meetings towards organizational and administrative 
questions - for example, what size and scope such a course would need so that 
all the tendencies could give elective disciplines? - the Circle’s activity revealed 
an	unexpected	result,	one	that	surely	did	not	sit	well	with	the	identificatory	
structure of the Party, even though it clearly took the Party’s best interests in 
view. This disjunction between the Party’s ideal and its common form appeared 
in the symptomatic response it gave to the Circle, a sort of common resistance 
- coming from usually disagreeing peers - that such a proposal was simply 
impossible,	even	if	it	was	nothing	more	than	the	most	naive	affirmation	of	the	
Party’s explicit unity. Even without the support of the Party’s administrative 
structure or its militant organizations, the Circle nonetheless experimentally 
created	a	unified	“summer	course”	of	political	formation	for	militants.	The	
activity remains the largest formation course given by PSOL in the state of 
Rio de Janeiro, with more than a dozen disciplines given by militants of some 
competing currents of the Party. It was, for sure, an utter failure, insofar as 
the Circle’s lack of experience in dealing with the vicissitudes of party politics 
lead it to navigate the political sensibilities of its interlocutors without enough 
care or attention to its contradictions, reinforcing certain divisions and falling 
short of making the space available to the most radical political tendencies in 
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the Party. Because of this, the Circle was powerless to distinguish its formal 
engagement with the Party from the accusations that, in doing so, it was merely 
holding on to a hidden ideal of what should be taught and accomplished by in 
the course it proposed. That is, CSII lacked the knowledge of how to distinguish 
the investigative activity of an idea from the constructivist engagement with 
an ideal that was simply not that of the institution at stake. However, insofar as 
this experiment was not attempted for the sake of proving the Circle’s own ideal 
apprehension of itself - so that its failure would put the collective’s “real” Leftism 
in question - but rather with the aim of verifying if it was possible to export 
CSII’s fundamental wagers into new contexts, this failure was homogeneous with 
the Circle’s organization, internal to it. Because this experiment composed the 
trajectory of a thinking, it was later at the disposal of its members as a challenge 
for thought. 
 A great deal has been written since the 60’s to criticize the capacity of 
constructive engagement to respect the plurality and contradictory views that 
Marxism now recognizes as a fundamental characteristic of the working class’s 
composition. Against the unifying and idealized presuppositions of task-driven, 
identificatory	militancy,	certain	Marxists	propose	a	more	spontaneous	approach	
to	militant	activity,	suggesting	that	today	we	must	first	of	all	respect	the	
creative	differences	of	each	local	struggle	and	then	find	ways	of	unifying	them	
in a common banner. In short, this strategic model trusts that we can let go of 
“base work” today because we not only know that there is no homogeneous 
base waiting to change the world in an organized fashion, but also because 
we know that local struggles, being part of the same capitalist “cycle of 
struggles” will already implicitly carry within them a deeper homogeneity, 
which a communist project can “tap” into in order to unify them from the global 
perspective. From the standpoint of the work we have proposed here - and 
considering specially the Marxist treatment of social forms as the thinking 
implicit in the most immediate being-there within a given form of sociality - it 
seems to us that such a response fails to break away from the constructivist 
approach. It merely substitutes the position that we should all act in a certain 
ideal way in order to achieve our political goals for the presupposition that, 
however we act, this ideal of unity will be preserved: in the case of PSOL, it 
would mean that all the different tendencies of the party could be expected 
to ultimately desire their own unity, something we would be able to attest by 
finding	a	common	trait	running	through	all	their	different	and	incongruous	
positions. 
 While this critique of constructivist political engagement has the clear 
benefit	of	departing	from	heterogeneity	rather	than	engaging	solely	with	
instances of previously established consensus, it carries with it one fundamental 
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precept that still ties it to the model of engagement that it criticizes: the 
assumption that there can be a common purpose. The basic schema of the 
constructivist or functional activity remains in place: a transformation which 
departs	from	a	unified	want	or	a	set	of	partial	wants,	and	achieves	its	more-
or-less ideal satisfaction. What CSII’s wager on the political usefulness of 
investigative activity achieves is a break with this basic model of action, while 
preserving its original vocation.
	 One	could	argue,	after	all,	that	failing	to	organize	a	unified	course	of	
political formation in a Leftist Party is just that, a useless failure. Or that visiting 
workers in the suburbs with the explicit goal of just listening to what they 
have to say does not contribute to the betterment of the worker’s lives in any 
meaningful sense. And this much is true, if seen from a disengaged standpoint - 
that is, a standpoint that is not committed to the experimentation, constitutive 
of the Circle’s project, of testing if this organization is itself capable of formally 
accommodating anyone. From within CSII, however, these failures and useless 
activities take on a different quality. Having separated the tasks of composing 
a thought and having it at the disposal of its members - that is, separating 
the transformations which affect the capacity of the collective to indifferently 
welcome everyone from the intellectual apprehension of these transformation’s 
rules and effects - the true achievement of the Circle is to affect the range of 
actual, concrete people over which this failure or uselessness falls. And such 
an extension is not meaningless when considered from the standpoint of the 
following	affirmation:	not	everyone	has	the	right	to	experience	failure	as	part	of	
a form of thought. 
 Class struggle does not simply divide the world between those who have 
and those who don’t - it also divides us between those who have the lack of 
what they do not have and those who are expropriated of this lack itself. The 
former are those who can subjectivize their suffering and turn their symptoms 
into	the	“stuff”	of	psychoanalytic	investigations,	scientific	and	political	thinking,	
etc - in short, those who have enough material resources to live, that is, to 
participate in generic thinking. The latter are those whose suffering is, at best, 
the material out of which the thinking of others is composed: sociologists, 
generous charities, Leftist militants, populist and religious leaders - all are 
ready to refer to the harsh conditions of mere survival, but those who are too 
busy surviving simply cannot afford to join in the “cycle of struggles” that is 
supposedly constructing a new common ideal. 
 The Circle of Studies of Idea and Ideology is experimenting with a form 
that, while being porous to the heterogeneity of the world, nonetheless exposes 
those it forms to a political experience of thought where those engaged in 
it are allowed to collectively assume their own failures - that is, to “acquire a 
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new need”, as Marx puts it - and live by them. It is true that political activities 
conceived as localized experiments on a form’s capacity to include anyone can 
be said to serve no purpose. But our wager is that, in doing so, the Circle also 
seeks to expose anyone who wishes to engage with it to a life that is at no one’s 
service.
 Finally, it is important to note that CSII does not constitute a mere 
application	of	philosophical	and	political	ideals	into	the	field	of	militant	practice.	
Even if the project did begin with explicit reference to contemporary political 
thinking, to the point that certain authors are even quoted in the Circle’s project, 
the concrete existence of its different cells has required the document to be re-
written several times over, philosophies to be reconsidered, and presuppositions 
to be challenged. In fact, the current state of the Circle is not one of stability, 
and our case study does not represent more than a partial fragment of an 
on-going transformative practice. It does seem truly important to put the 
partial results of this investigation to writing - and a brief comparison of our 
elaborations here to the original guidelines of the Circle would be enough to 
show that these elaborations have followed rather than preceded the collective 
application of those guidelines - but it is also crucial to end this brief case study 
with	some	final	remarks	on	the	current	tensions	and	limitations	with	which	the	
Circle struggles, and which surely will lead us to a renewed engagement with 
our guiding thinkers and ideas, hopefully leading to new militant experiments.
 The Circle today faces two great impediments: the problem of inhibition 
and the problem of time. First of all, it has become increasingly hard to dispel 
the	fantasies	that,	below	the	affirmation	that	“anyone	can	study	philosophy”,	
there lies a secret superegoic injunction to speak in a sophisticated way, or 
to understand certain ideas. The very expansion of the Circle, the fact that 
there are other cells working in parallel, to which a participant has no direct 
access, seem to create a space for any member who feels insecure about his 
ignorance to deposit his fantasies and suppositions. This problem, which we 
are still learning how to deal with, could also lead us to a renewed engagement 
with Jacques Rancière’s work, leading us to pose, for example, the question 
of the superegoic imperative that the “axiom of equality” can become without 
some sort of supplementary mechanism. How are we to deal with the inhibition 
- which also appears as aggressive resistance - that emerges there where the 
Circle is incapable of dispelling the supposition that those who have more 
academic formation or political experience are more “in the know” of what to do 
than those who have just joined CSII? 
 The second problem concerns the economic solution that the group 
will need to invent in order to deal with the fact that militancy either takes up 
the time of work or the time of rest of the Circle’s participants. In a sense, the 
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problem at stake here has a classical form in Marxist thinking, namely, that 
militancy is a form of leisure, and leisure is a time whose “stuff” is taken from the 
time of consumption of labor force or the time of its reproduction (rest), both 
of which are covered by one’s wage, and both of which are therefore under the 
rule of remuneration. The usual solution is appeal to a voluntaristic dimension, 
arguing that militancy is its own reward. Badiou himself, in his theory of “true 
life” could be said to spouse this position. The concrete obstacle of organizing 
meetings, visiting the suburbs, or having free time to read or debate, has turned 
the economic tension into a problem worthy of philosophical consideration: how 
should one treat the economic constraints of militancy? Should we perhaps look 
for a revitalized Leninist theory of “professional revolutionaries”? No solution 
today seems apt enough to guide us, but we are currently engaged with several 
experiments on how to pay militants for the time politics takes from our lives, 
experiments which, thus far, have revealed surprising results - for example, the 
unexpected solidarity between the working class and the working militant, who, 
on account of her pay, is seen as someone who also struggles to survive, who 
therefore belongs to a common struggle, rather to the privileged few who have 
spare time available to engage such activities without any risk.
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